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Abstract We develop an endogenous-growth model
in which we distinguish between inventors and
innovators. This distinction implies that stronger
protection of intellectual property rights has an
inverted U-shaped effect on economic growth. Intel-
lectual property rights protection attributes part of the
rents of commercial exploitation to the inventor that
would otherwise accrue to the entrepreneur. Stronger
patent protection will therefore increase the incentive
to do research and development (R&D) and generate
new knowledge. This new knowledge has a positive
effect on entrepreneurship, innovation, and growth.
However, after some point, further strengthening of
patent protection will reduce the returns to entrepre-
neurship sufficiently to reduce the overall growth rate.
Keywords Intellectual property rights  Knowledge
spillovers  Endogenous growth  Entrepreneurship 
R&D  Innovation  Invention processes  Inventions
JEL Classifications M13  O31  O34  O41
1 Introduction
Reforms in the US patent system over the past few
decades have caused an explosion in patent applications
and grants (Gallini 2002; Jaffe and Lerner 2004). These
reforms were aimed at strengthening the position of
patent holders, and they were successful in increasing
the productivity of research measured in patents.
However, it has also been argued that the quality and
importance of these patents have decreased and that the
patent boom has not generated the economic growth
that might have been expected (Jaffe and Lerner 2004).
This has provoked a debate on the theoretical and
empirical justifications for strengthening patent pro-
tection among policy-makers and academics.
The debate on patents is not new. In fact, for as
long as patents have existed, scholars have debated
the optimal length, strength, and breadth of protec-
tion. A strong rationale for more protection has been
formalized in endogenous, innovation-driven growth
models such as those put forth by Romer (1990),
Aghion and Howitt (1992), Segerstrom et al. (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Stokey (1995), and
Young (1993). In these models knowledge creation
drives economic growth in the long run. Conse-
quently, intellectual property rights (IPR) protection
is considered a key institution that allows inventors to
market their inventions and thereby recover their
costs. The logic in these models implies that stronger
IPR protection stimulates investment in knowledge
creation and consequently causes higher growth.
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The empirical growth literature indeed strongly
supports the notion that institutions in general (Barro
1996; Sala-I-Martin 1996; Acemoglu et al. 2001) and
IPR protection in particular (Varsakelis 2001; Bran-
stetter et al. 2006; Kanwar 2006; Allred and Park
2007) contribute to growth performance. However,
this same literature does not support the premise that
more and stronger protection is always better.
Instead, evidence of an inverted-U-shaped relation-
ship is growing (Gould and Gruben 1996), and some
theoretical arguments for such a relationship have
already been proposed; for example, Nordhaus (1969)
pointed out that static efficiency losses need to be
traded off against dynamic innovation gains, and
several other mechanisms have been suggested in
what one might label the patent literature.1 This
literature, however, relies largely on partial equilib-
rium modeling techniques. This makes it difficult to
evaluate the importance of these mechanisms for
overall economic growth and innovation. Analyzing
the trade-offs in the context of general equilibrium,
endogenous innovation-driven growth models is a
recent research trajectory aimed at connecting these
two literatures, and the area of focus in this paper.
Nordhaus’s arguments, for example, have been
formalized in general equilibrium innovation-driven
growth models by Kwan and Lai (2003) and Iwaisako
and Futagami (2003). Both papers show that static
losses can be weighed against dynamic gains, and
thus, an optimum level of protection exists. Horii and
Iwaisako (2007) and Furukawa (2007) focus on the
reduced growth potential in an economy with more
monopolized sectors. However, as O’Donoghue and
Zweilmueller (2004) observe, little further analysis of
the role of IPR protection in knowledge-driven
general equilibrium models has been done.2
While these models show that IPR protection can
be too much of a good thing, they remain strongly
committed to the assumption that patents provide
economic incentives for innovation. They weigh
static efficiency costs (that increase in the level of
protection) against dynamic benefits of innovation
(that remain constant or increase at a decreasing rate
in the level of protection) to find an optimum. We
present a model in which more protection can also
reduce the rate of innovation in equilibrium.3
Moreover, we argue that IPR protection cannot be
understood in the context of existing modern general
equilibrium endogenous growth models. Commer-
cialization is, after all, assumed to be trivial. Inno-
vation-driven endogenous growth models collapse
the process of innovation, i.e., the subsequent gener-
ation, exploration, and exploitation of the knowledge
that constitutes a commercial opportunity, into one
rational decision that is entirely motivated by down-
stream commercial rents.
In this paper, we follow the knowledge spillover
theory of entrepreneurship and stress the distinction
between invention and innovation, as was suggested
by Carlsson et al. (2009). Knowledge, created by
inventors, spills over to the economy at large through
commercialization and the activity of entrepreneurs
and, once commercialized, helps future invention
1 There exists, for example, a literature in contract theory (e.g.,
Grossman and Hart 1986; Aghion and Tirole 1994) as well as a
large industrial organization literature on the strategic use of
patents (e.g., Teece 1986, 2006) and the implications for
optimal patent policy design. In particular, issues such as
disclosure in sequential innovation processes, fragmented
innovation processes, and cumulative or cooperative research
projects have been addressed. Examples of papers in this
literature include Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Gallini (1992),
Scotchmer (1991), Green and Scotchmer (1995), Chang
(1995), Matutes et al. (1996), Scotchmer (1996), Van Dijk
(1996), O’Donoghue (1998), O’Donoghue et al. (1998), Hunt
(1999), Gallini and Scotchmer (2001), Maurer and Scotchmer
(2002), Bessen and Mashkin (2006), and Kullti and Takalo
(2008). Gallini (2002) gives a good overview. We thank Josh
Lerner for bringing this literature to our attention.
2 O’Donoghue and Zweilmueller (2004) then examine the role
of patent policy and explore how a general equilibrium analysis
can contribute to the patent design literature. Other notable
exceptions in this literature are Chou and Shy (1993), Helpman
(1993), Davidson and Segerstrom (1998), Cheng and Tao
(1999), and Li (2001). However, the aim of this paper is not to
contribute to the patent design literature, as our crude, one-
dimensional representation of IPR protection simply does not
allow for such analysis. Instead we abstract from the
complexity of optimal patent design and analyze the impact
on growth of all IPR instruments that shift the distribution of
the rents of innovation between inventors and commercializers.
3 Admittedly we analyze a very reduced form of IPR
protection by recognizing only one dimension of IPR protec-
tion in the model. We feel this is appropriate as we aim to
illustrate a more fundamental mechanism at work. Our model
is not very useful in the search for the optimal patent design but
rather puts that search in a broader perspective.
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elsewhere.4 This makes knowledge creation and
commercialization dynamic complements in generat-
ing economic growth. We build on the same intuition
presented in Michelacci (2003), who already sug-
gested that knowledge creation and commercializa-
tion reinforce each other in the growth process.
There, intuition was operationalized by modeling the
matching of new ideas to entrepreneurs. More
intensively searching entrepreneurs then also gener-
ate more invention, because there are more matches
and that increases the ex ante expected returns to
knowledge creation. We take this one step further by
analyzing a direct knowledge spillover that makes
R&D more productive as well.5 Our contribution to
the literature is to show that, even in the absence of
matching, a relatively simple two-way knowledge
spillover structure already generates qualitatively
similar outcomes, and we do so in a standard
endogenous growth framework.
Our model closely resembles the basic Romer
(1990) variety expansion model. However, in our
specification it is the entrepreneur who holds the
residual claim to any monopoly rents that a new
intermediate variety may generate once commercially
introduced. In placing the entrepreneur center-stage,
we bring back Schumpeter’s (1934) original assump-
tion that knowledge creation and commercialization
are two separate activities. Furthermore, entrepre-
neurs and not inventors are driven by the prospect of
capturing commercial rents from an innovation.
These rents are the entrepreneur’s reward for seeing
the commercial potential, taking the risks, investing
the resources, and organizing the production neces-
sary for a new (intermediate) product or service. To
our knowledge, we present the first general equilib-
rium endogenous growth model that explicitly sep-
arates invention from innovation and models the
knowledge spillovers between the two activities.
To prevent our model from reverting to the exog-
enous Solow-esque ‘‘manna from heaven’’ models, we
introduce an additional private economic incentive to
generate new knowledge. This incentive in our model
comes primarily from cost competition among final
goods producers. They will invest resources in R&D to
improve upon existing product lines, and we assume
that, in the course of that activity, they generate
knowledge that is of no direct commercial value to
them. That knowledge, however, presents an opportu-
nity for entrepreneurs, who are willing and able to take
the risks to develop and commercialize it. An entre-
preneur will do so when the expected (risk-adjusted)
returns justify that investment. Without IPR protection,
the knowledge spillover is costless and the investment
is set equal to the wages foregone in engaging in the
venture.
Patent protection then shifts rents from the entre-
preneur to the inventor, and more patent protection
reduces the incentives to commercialize new knowl-
edge, as well as creates incentives to generate more.
The latter mechanism is well understood. Our model
now introduces an offsetting effect that explains why
the relationship between innovation and IPR protec-
tion is not strictly positive. Consequently, there is an
optimum level of protection that can be exceeded.
This question is highly relevant for modern knowl-
edge-based economies. In a system without protection
of intellectual property, invention may well be the
bottleneck in the innovative cycle. Initially, patents
were awarded to benefit royal favorites. When the
connection between invention and exclusive property
rights was introduced, it was an institutional revolution
that helped spur invention and arguably paved the way
for the Industrial Revolution.6 So it is now the inventor,
4 Here, we define ‘‘entrepreneurship’’ to be the act of actually
commercializing an already existing opportunity for innova-
tion. The extant literature (e.g., Gartner 1990; Churchill and
Muzyka 1994; Venkataraman 1997; Brazael 1999; Shane and
Venkataraman 2000; Brown et al. 2001; and many more)
offers a broad range of definitions, from Kirznerian (1973)
arbitrageurs to Schumpeterian (1934) innovators. Our
Schumpeterian ‘‘entrepreneurs’’ have the function to recognize
and exploit opportunities, created by other agents (inventors) in
the model. We assume this to separate the two stages in the
process. It is very possible for actual entrepreneurs to create,
recognize, and commercialize an opportunity. In our model, the
same person then creates the opportunity as an inventor and
commercializes it as entrepreneur. Modeling this as one
decision, however, would obscure the impact of strong IPR
protection that we aim to uncover.
5 In the Michelacci (2003) paper entrepreneurial activity
makes R&D more attractive but not more productive. The
positive effect on growth comes from generating stronger
incentives for R&D. In our model commercialization makes
new knowledge creation more productive directly.
6 This has been argued by Fox (1947) and North (1981).
Greasley and Oxley (2007) actually present a compelling case
that the Industrial Revolution made patenting more valuable
and thus caused the surge in patenting, rather than the other
way around.
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not the entrepreneur, who is allowed to establish legal
ownership over an invention in current patent systems.
We argue that a delicate balancing act is required once
such a system is in place. In most Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries today, entrepreneurship and not invention
seems to have become the bottleneck in the innovative
process (Carlsson et al. 2010), and the balance may
well be beyond the tipping point.
By enforcing patents more strictly and allowing
inventors to patent much more easily, Jaffe and
Lerner (2004) argue that the US patent system has
now exceeded the optimum and that rents should be
redistributed to the entrepreneurs. However, in their
analysis, it is not the static efficiency losses from
monopoly that offset the dynamic gains. They argue
that strengthening IPR protection where it was
already strong has actually hurt the innovation
process by killing incentives to commercialize.7 Our
paper embeds their narrative in a well-established
general equilibrium framework with endogenous
innovation-driven growth and firm decision-theoret-
ical microfoundations. Following Schumpeter (1934),
our model also places the entrepreneur at the heart of
growth theory.
The structure of this paper is as follows: We
present our model in Sect. 2 and derive the equilib-
rium properties and implications of intellectual
property rights protection in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 we
examine comparative statics and the impact of
stronger patent protection. We conclude the paper
in Sect. 5.
2 The basic model
2.1 Final consumption and production
The basic structure of our model follows Romer
(1990) and is standard in the literature (see, for
example, Barro and Sala-I-Martin 2004). First
assume that consumers are infinitely lived and choose
consumption, C, to maximize their lifetime utility.
We follow the textbook case where direct utility is
given by U = log(C(t)). Under the standard inter-
temporal budget constraint, where income can be
spent on the consumption of final goods or the
purchase of new bonds that yield a return, r(t), we
obtain that in equilibrium _CðtÞ=CðtÞ ¼ rðtÞ  q;
where a dot represents a time derivative and q is
the discount rate.8
In final goods production a mass 1 of identical
firms j is assumed to have the same constant returns





with 0\aþ b\1 and 0\a; b\1;
ð1Þ
where Xj(t) is the output of final goods by producer j
at time t, LPj(t) is production labor that earns wage
wP(t), and xj(i,t) is the quantity of intermediate i
bought at price v(i,t). All these quantities are flows.
Aj(t) represents the level of accumulated knowledge
in the firm, and n(t) is the number of available
varieties of intermediate goods at time t. These
variables are stock variables. By employing special-
ized R&D labor, LRj(t), that earns a wage wR(t), the
firm’s knowledge base can be expanded according to
_AjðtÞ ¼ wAjðtÞ1cnðtÞcLRjðtÞ with 0 \ c \ 1: ð2Þ
The presence of Aj(t) reflects an intertemporal
knowledge spillover. R&D is more productive when
a large knowledge base has been developed in the
past but at a decreasing rate. The presence of n(t)
represents the positive spillover effect of more
variety in intermediates on process R&D. With more
variety in intermediates, the final goods-producing
sector has more degrees of flexibility to organize the
production process more efficiently and thereby
generate more total factor-augmenting technical
change for a given level of R&D effort. Alternatively,
one can say that the relevant knowledge base for firm
j’s R&D is assumed to be a Cobb–Douglas aggregate
of public and private knowledge, proxied by n and Aj,
respectively. w is a scaling productivity parameter.
7 Jaffe and Lerner (2004) mention, for example, the case of
Texas Instruments, where the patent enforcement department
has grown to become the second largest profit center in the
corporation.
8 See, e.g., Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004). It is also useful to
note at this stage that, in such a setup, growth maximization
and welfare maximization are equivalent for given initial
wealth levels (see, e.g., Barro 1990; Greiner 1998). We refer to
this equivalence and only discuss the growth-maximizing level
of IPR protection below.
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We have chosen a linear specification in R&D labor,
following Romer (1990).
A higher stock of relevant production knowledge
already provides an incentive to employ R&D workers.
However, in addition, we introduce the possibility to
patent knowledge that is generated in the R&D process
but not directly relevant to the firm itself. If these
patents are licensed out, the total license income of the
firm, Yj, depends on the profits that the licensees can
generate, P(t), on the strength of the relative bargain-
ing position of licensor and licensee, n, and on the
growth rate of the firm-specific knowledge base. We
assume that license income is proportional to the rate of
knowledge creation, relative bargaining power, and




Assuming perfect competition in final goods
production and normalizing the price of the final
good to 1, all firms then choose LPj(t), xj(i,t), and













As wages and prices as well as the number of
intermediate varieties are given to the firm, the
dynamic optimization problem has 2 ? n control and
1 state variables. Dropping time arguments to save on
notation and substituting for output, knowledge
creation, and license income using Eqs. 1–3, this

















where the levels of employment, LPj and LRj, and
intermediate use, xj(i), are control variables and the
stock of firm-specific knowledge, Aj, is the relevant
state variable. The solution is therefore characterized
by n ? 5 first-order conditions. From the first-order
conditions, we first obtain the standard Cobb–Doug-





















The total wage sum for production workers is then
bX. For given employment levels, Eq. 4 shows that
wages grow at the same rate as total output in
equilibrium.10 For intermediates the firm will choose
the levels of each variety to satisfy n first-order
conditions that yield isoelastic demand curves for








ð1 a bÞXj: ð5Þ
Multiplying (5) by v(i) and summing over all
varieties i shows that the total expenditure on
intermediates by firm j is (1 - a - b)Xj.
11 Together
with the result on the wage costs, this implies that the
final goods sector makes an operating profit of aX.
It can be verified that, at the value maximizing
levels of employment and intermediate use, the firm’s
output is proportional to its knowledge stock, Aj(t).
12
Firms can therefore invest resources in R&D to
increase output and operating profits. Moreover, the
R&D generates license income if the knowledge
generated is commercially valuable [P(t) [ 0] and
the patent system allows patent owners to capture
some of the rents from commercialization (n[ 0).
Intuitively, final goods producer will increase R&D
activity as long as the discounted future benefits of
9 We assume that the firm must generate a steady flow of new
knowledge to sustain a constant level of license income to
reflect the fact that patents expire and license fees fall with the
age of the patent as more substitutes are available.
10 Note that we assume zero population growth.
11 Summing over all final goods producers j then yields the
result that total expenditure on intermediates in the economy is
(1 - a - b)X.
12 Substituting firm-level labor demand from (4) and the
demand for intermediate goods in (5) into (1) and using v to
represent the average price of intermediate goods, we obtain
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doing so exceed the current labor costs at the margin.
As R&D is a deterministic process in our model, the
firms can decide to spend on R&D exactly up to that
point. The solution is formally characterized by two
first-order conditions, one transversality condition,



















¼ _Aj ¼ wA1cj ncLRj;
where the first condition implies that firms will hire
R&D labor until the marginal cost, wR, equals the
sum of the discounted present value of marginal
benefits, which consist of the license income and the
shadow value, lj, of a higher knowledge stock that a









Taking the time derivative and setting that expres-
sion equal to minus the right-hand side in the second
condition equates the marginal return on Aj to the
time derivative of this shadow value. Substituting the
inverted law of motion (2) and the inverted produc-


















Equation 6 defines the wage level at which R&D
workers will be employed by firm j. The wage level that
solves (6) represents a horizontal demand function for
R&D labor. If R&D wages exceed the threshold,
no R&D workers will be employed by firm j. As long as
R&D wages fall short, firm j will hire additional R&D
















r  _wR=wR þ c _n=nð Þ ;
ð7Þ
where we have substituted for Xj using (4) and (5) in
(1).15 As (7) holds for all firms j and all firms are price
takers in input markets, an equilibrium in the R&D
labor market requires that all firms that hire R&D pay
the same wage. It can be verified in (7) that the
threshold wage is firm specific and depends nonmono-
tonically on the value of Aj. The slope of the right-hand
side switches sign from negative to positive at













This implies that the right-hand side of (7) is
decreasing in Aj for Aj \ AS, and increasing in Aj for
Aj [ AS. Assuming for simplicity that firms always
start at an initial level of knowledge A0 [ AS, there is
a unique level of Aj that all firms must attain to hire
R&D labor.16 The mechanism is that the firms with
Aj = A
max then also have the highest threshold wage
for R&D. They will thus bid up R&D wages to this
threshold level and employ a positive amount of
R&D. Their level of A will then rise according to (2),
and those with AS B Aj \ A
max will not hire any R&D
and their Aj remains stable. The rise in A
max pushes up
the threshold but also increases the average A, causing
production wages and intermediate prices to rise. In
any equilibrium with R&D, only those firms that have
Aj = A
max can stay in the race, whereas others are
forced to bring down their production employment
and intermediate use levels to 0.17 If we assume
13 Time arguments have been included in the transversality
condition as the limit is taken for time to infinity.
14 This so-called bang–bang equilibrium is a result of the
constant returns to R&D labor assumption that we have made.
15 See footnote 12.
16 If we do not make this assumption, there might be firms that
wish to hire R&D labor at the market wage but reduce that
willingness as that R&D increases their Aj. These firms would
withdraw from the market after some time as long as there is at
least one final goods producer that has Aj C AS.
17 Taken literally, this result may appear unrealistic, and it
yields the undesirable result that initial levels of production
knowledge have to be exactly equal. However, it is worth
noting that, for example, uncertainty in the R&D process and
fixed costs have been assumed away. In real life, the
uncertainty in R&D outcomes would create a range, rather
than a precise level, for the threshold wage, and fixed costs
would cause firms to actually exit when employment levels fall
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therefore that all firms start from the same initial level
of Aj(0) = A0 [ AS, the above implies that Aj(t) =
Amax(t) = A(t) for all j and we obtain for (7) that
wR ¼
aX þ r  _P=P nP wAcnc
r  _wR=wR þ c _n=nð Þ : ð8Þ
We have shown above that a stable labor demand
in production requires an equilibrium in which wages
grow at the same rate as output. Equation 8 shows
that the threshold wage level for R&D workers will
also satisfy that constraint as long as A and n grow at
the same rate and total profits grow in proportion to
final output. We show below that these conditions are
satisfied in the steady state, so there is no long-run
relative wage divergence between R&D and produc-
tion labor wages, and the income distribution is
stable.
Interpreting IPR protection as a strengthening of
the relative bargaining power of knowledge creators,
i.e., increasing n, Eq. 8 shows the traditional inno-
vation-enhancing effect of patent protection. Higher
levels of IPR protection will cause the threshold wage
level to go up for a given level of intermediate sector
profits. If R&D then competes for its labor inputs
with other activities in the model, stronger protection
implies higher R&D and productivity improvement.18
To bring out our argument in the model we assume
that R&D in final goods-producing firms competes
over skilled labor with innovative activity (entry) in
the intermediate sector. With all the differences one
can think of, R&D and entrepreneurship are both
largely non-routine and highly skilled activities that
distinguish themselves more from routine unskilled
production labor than from each other. We now turn
to the intermediate goods sector.
2.2 Intermediate producers and entrepreneurs
The intermediate sector produces intermediate goods
according to some specific process available to one
intermediate firm only. We assume, however, that
there are n varieties available to compete as imperfect
substitutes and that new ones are allowed to enter.
One can think of the intermediate designs as being
codified in a blueprint and protected by a patent, as in
Romer (1990). Entrepreneurs, however, often bring a
unique combination of tacit knowledge, training,
talent, access to finance and support networks, etc., to
their ventures, and by definition come up with a
commercial opportunity that no-one recognized
before.19 Therefore, we can justify the assumption
that, even in the absence of patent protection, every
intermediate will be produced exclusively by one
firm, and subsequent entry with a perfect substitute is
not possible. The big difference now is that knowl-
edge is excludable but not tradable. As in Romer
(1990), the producers in this sector are monopolists
that set their own price and compete only with
imperfect substitutes.
By the assumed symmetry in the final goods-
production function, all varieties face the same,
isoelastic demand curve for their variety. All inter-
mediates are produced using a simple one-for-one
technology out of raw capital, K, and we assume that
the monopolists are price takers in that input market,
paying the market interest rate, r. The problem is then
identical for every intermediate producer i. Formally,




: pðiÞ ¼ vðiÞxðiÞ  rKðiÞ s:t:: 5ð Þ and
x ið Þ ¼ K ið Þ:
It follows that prices are set atvðiÞ ¼ r
1ab and
do not vary over varieties i anymore. As every
Footnote 17 continued
below a critical level. Then, the prediction is that a group of
technology leaders will be able to survive in the market, where
they must ‘‘run to stand still,’’ and a shake-out will cause firms
with less than efficient production processes to exit in the
transition to the steady state. Such processes are well known in
the empirical literature on industrial dynamics (Gort and
Klepper 1982; Klepper 1996). They are present in a very
stylized form in our model.
18 Our model can thus generate a trade-off between dynamic
benefits of more innovation against the static loss of current
output lost by assuming innovation and production compete
over the same limited resources. This is a different channel for
the trade-off than in Nordhaus (1969), as process innovation,
investments in firm-specific knowledge, do not create monop-
oly profits.
19 There are quite a few definitions of entrepreneurship in the
literature. We follow the Schumpeterian tradition that defines
the entrepreneur as the agent that implements an invention
commercially; see, e.g., Braunerhjelm (2008) for a discussion
and further references.
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intermediate producer sets his price equal to this
value and faces the same demand function, all
intermediates are demanded in the same quantity.
This implies that, in equilibrium, the stock of raw
capital is divided equally among all n varieties of
intermediate goods and the capital share in income is
given by rK ¼ ð1 a bÞ2X, whereas the monopoly
rents in the intermediate sector will be given by




pðiÞ ¼ ðaþ bÞð1 a bÞX: ð9Þ
These profits accrue to the entrepreneur who
organized the intermediate production unit, as no
other inputs or fixed (entry) costs have been assumed.
However, not all rents can remain with the entrepre-
neur. If intermediate i is based on knowledge that is
protected by a patent, then the patent holder can
charge a license fee that reduces the flow of rents to
the entrepreneur. As assumed above, the share
retained by the entrepreneurs is (1 - n).
The positive (expected) flow of retained rents
attracts new entrants. These entrants cannot enter an
existing intermediate variety market, as we assume
that these are protected by trade secrets, unique
essential entrepreneurial traits or otherwise. However,
the existence of these rents and the knowledge that
there is a latent demand for new varieties makes it
attractive to start one’s own venture and enter with a
new intermediate variety. The value of such a new
venture depends on the level of retainable profits. We
assume for simplicity that all entrants receive their idea
as a knowledge spillover from downstream final goods
producers’ process R&D, such that all new entrants
take into account the license fees that will be due.
In Eq. 3 we assumed that the final goods sector
appropriates a share n of total intermediate profits for
every 100% expansion of their knowledge base. This
total license income is collected from the n interme-
diate firms that exist at time t. As all intermediate
firms are fully symmetric, we assume that all
contribute an equal amount to total license fees.20
With total profits given in Eq. 9 as n times pi and
taking the discounted present value of retained profits
as the value of a new venture, we obtain as the value




ertð1 n _A=AÞpði; tÞdt





where r is the discount rate that the entrepreneur
applies.22 We assume that the entrepreneur, as owner
of the firm, can appropriate this value but also
propose that this requires the investment of time and
is therefore costly in terms of (skilled/R&D) wages
foregone. The entry function is given by
_nðtÞ ¼ uAðtÞdnðtÞ1dLEðtÞ where 0 \ d\ 1: ð10Þ
As the final production process is better under-
stood, more ideas for new and further specialized
intermediates are likely to emerge. We, therefore,
assume that entry is positive in the accumulated
knowledge in final goods-producers process R&D,
A(t). The presence of n(t) reflects the fact that
accumulated entrepreneurial experience increases the
entry rate for given levels of activity and knowledge
20 Or, equivalently, run an identical ex ante risk of being
charged and forced to pay license fees, such that the expected
value is equal to the average license fees per intermediate firm.
21 Note that we ignore the marginal effect of adding one more
variety to the profits per variety. The value of a marginal new
intermediate firm is then equal to the value of an existing
intermediate firm.
22 We do not consider the possibility that this rate deviates
from the risk-free interest rate due to the risky nature of
entrepreneurial ventures and/or capital market imperfections
they may face. This does not affect our results qualitatively,
and there are extensions to be addressed by further research. If
the profit flow is at risk, for example, the discount rate includes
a risk premium that captures the flow probability of losing the
entire profit flow. As was argued by Jaffe and Lerner (2004),
with excessive patent protection this parameter turns positive
in the strength of patent protection. Of course, a patent
infringement suit is usually settled out of court and does not
result in the entire profit flow disappearing. However, by
assuming that a high probability of losing some profits reduces
the value of the firm to the entrepreneur in the same way as a
low probability to lose the entire profit flow, we can still
interpret the risk premium as reflecting the ease of obtaining
and upholding patents in court. See, for example, Aghion and
Howitt (1998), who show that a positive flow probability of
losing a profit flow can be incorporated by including that
probability in the discount rate.
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availability. Alternatively, one can interpret this
specification as stating that entry is proportional to
a Cobb–Douglas aggregate of accumulated public
knowledge in entrepreneurship and R&D. u is a
scaling productivity parameter, and as before we have
assumed constant returns to skilled entrepreneurial
labor, LE.
d may be interpreted as a parameter that reflects
the knowledge filter. This concept was first coined by
Acs et al. (2004) to describe the institutional,
informational, and otherwise existing barriers to
knowledge spillover between knowledge creators
and commercializers. In the context of our model,
one could think of nondisclosure agreements, labor
contract limitations on moving to competing firms,
and defensive patenting strategies in final goods-
producing firms. Anything the final goods-producing
firms does to limit the spillover of knowledge,
including legal and other action, will reduce d. This
reduces the entry of new intermediates for given
increases in knowledge and levels of entrepreneurial
activity.23 Rent income to the marginal entrepreneur










As this trade-off is identical for entrants over time,
we can replace T by t and Eq. 11 can be rewritten as
the flow of income for entrepreneurial labor, where
we assume that, at the time of entry, entrepreneurs
expect output and variety to expand at a constant rate
(as they will in steady state), such that XðtÞ ¼
XðTÞe _X=Xtand nðtÞ ¼ nðTÞe _n=nt: Dropping time
arguments to save on notation, we obtain24
wE¼ðaþbÞð1abÞð1n
_A=AÞ
rþ _n=n _X=X uA
dndX: ð12Þ
As we assume that entrepreneurship competes with
R&D for skilled labor, no entry will take place if the
skilled wage exceeds this level. The opportunity costs
are too high, and all skilled labor is employed in
R&D. If it falls below this level, however, all skilled
labor will switch to entrepreneurial activity. We thus
have a bang–bang equilibrium due to the constant
returns to LE and LR. Note that this implies that, in
such a bang–bang equilibrium, either variety n or
knowledge A increases, while the other is stable. This
implies that A/n changes until the threshold wages in
(12) and (8) equalize. We use this property to derive
first the skilled labor market and then the steady-state
equilibrium in Sect. 3. We analyze the relevant
comparative statics in Sect. 4.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 The skilled labor market
The skilled labor market is in equilibrium when
wages equate total exogenous supply to the demand
in R&D and entrepreneurship and both activities earn
the same income.25 Formally, we have wR ¼ wE and
1 ¼ LR þ LE to determine the equilibrium, but let us
first consider what happens out of equilibrium. If
wR [ wE; then all skilled labor is allocated to R&D
and none to entrepreneurship. This implies that A/n
will rise. If wE [ wR instead, all skilled labor is
allocated to entrepreneurship and A/n will fall. Such
changes in A/n will push the threshold wages in (8)
and (12) towards each other. Only when wR ¼ wE is
the labor market allocation stable at positive levels of
both activities.23 From the derivative of Eq. 10 with respect to d it can be
verified that the impact is positive for A/n [ 1. This we can
assume to hold without loss of generality, as A can be
normalized to any positive number by an appropriate choice of
units in final goods production. Note that we now have two
ways in which IPR protection can inhibit innovation: (1)
through reducing the incentives to commercialize idle ideas,
captured by n, and (2) by blocking the diffusion of such idle
ideas, captured by d. We will focus on the former as more
relevant in this paper.
24 Where we have to assume that the growth rate of n does not
exceed the growth rate of output plus the interest rate, to ensure
that the integral can be evaluated. It will be shown below that
this assumption holds in the steady state.
25 We can normalize total skilled labor supply to 1 by an
appropriate choice of the scaling parameters u and w.
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Figure 1 plots the ratio wR=wE against A/n. The
above implies that the labor market may clear at any
ratio in the short run, but the corresponding allocation
of labor over R&D or entrepreneurship implies that we
will move towards the point where this ratio equals 1.
Even then, however, the model is not in a steady
state. The position of the convex curve still depends
on the various growth rates in the model, as can be
verified when we take the ratio of (8) over (12) and









 aþ ðaþ bÞð1 a bÞðr 
_X=XÞn
ðaþ bÞð1 a bÞð1 n _A=AÞ
r þ _n=n _X=X
r  _wR=wR þ c _n=n:
ð13Þ
Out of steady-state equilibrium, the labor market
will thus ensure that first A/n is at (A/n)*, but due to
the fact that (13) depends on the growth rates of
output, skilled wages, the interest rate, and the growth
rate of n, this (A/n)* is not necessarily the steady-state
ratio. A steady state is reached at (A/n)* only when
knowledge stocks have adjusted to such levels that A
and n grow at the same positive rate and (A/n)*
remains stable. We analyze the steady state below.
3.2 The steady state
The model is in steady-state equilibrium when all
variables expand at a constant rate and the skilled
labor market allocation is stable. From the arbitrage
Eqs. 8 and 12 and the analysis of the labor market
above we can derive that the allocation of skilled
labor is stable when A and n expand at the same
rate.26 Output, by the production function (1) and the
fact that all intermediates are used at level K/n, will






þ ðaþ bÞ _n
n




Using the fact that output in steady state grows at
the same rate as both wages, total wage income, and
consumption, we know that asset income must also
grow at that rate by the budget constraint of
consumers. Hence, asset and raw capital accumula-
tion must also take place at the growth rate of output.










As a stable labor allocation requires a constant
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Fig. 1 The skilled labor
market
26 Substituting for profits and computing the growth rates
for (8) and (12) immediately shows that, in any steady-
state equilibrium, the skilled wage will grow at rate
_wR
wR











Equation 4 has also shown that a stable steady-state demand
for production workers implies that the growth rate of unskilled
wages equals the growth rate of output. Both wage levels grow
at the same rate as output for a stable ratio A/n.


























This solves the model if we can obtain the steady-
state growth rate of n (and A). The first steady-state
condition follows from rewriting Eq. 13 for the
steady state. The ratio in Eq. 13 is 1 in equilibrium












where we define auxiliary parameters X  ðaþ bÞ
ð1 a bÞ; U  aþ Xqn, and functions Nð _n=nÞ ¼
1 n _n=n and Cð _n=nÞ ¼ qþc _n=nqþ _n=n to save on notation.
Equation 15 solves in parameters only for the special
case that n = 0 (no license income) and q = 0 (no
time preference). Using the condition that, in steady
state, variety expansion, _n=n, equals productivity
growth, _A=A, we can derive a second steady-state
relation between entrepreneurial activity and R&D









Using the labor market clearing condition 1 ¼
LR þ LE we can compute the steady-state level of
entrepreneurial and R&D activity. We thus obtain the
steady-state allocation of skilled labor as
LE ¼
1











Plugging the level of entrepreneurship in (16) into
the entry function in Eq. 10, dividing both sides by n,
and using (15) to solve for the rate of variety
expansion yields
ð _n=nÞ ¼ wUð Þ
d
cþd uXð Þ ccþd
X Cð _n=nÞNð _n=nÞð Þ dcþdþU Cð _n=nÞNð _n=nÞð Þ ccþd
:
ð17Þ
This equation determines the growth rate in steady
state by the fact that the right-hand side is a function
of that growth rate, but it cannot be solved
analytically.27 Equation 17 does allow us to make
the following proposition:
Proposition I There exists a positive, unique, and
stable steady-state equilibrium growth rate.
The proof is presented in Appendix 1.
4 Comparative statics and the impact of stronger
IPR protection
4.1 The key result
The effects of stronger IPR protection can now be
analyzed by deriving the impact of a higher n on this
steady-state growth rate, and we formulate our key
proposition.
Proposition II Strengthening the level of patent
protection as captured by an increase in n in our
model will only generate increases in the overall rate
of innovation if the initial level of protection is low
enough. More patent protection is beneficial for








Corollary I An increase in patent protection when
initial levels of patent protection are already high
will result in a reduction of overall innovation.









Appendix 2 provides the proofs.
The threshold level for n in Proposition II and
Corollary I are reached faster when the output
elasticity of knowledge in final goods production, a,
is large. Intuitively, this means patent protection is
less likely to be beneficial when private incentives to
R&D are already strong. The effects of the knowl-
edge spillover parameters in the R&D and the entry
functions, c and d, are ambiguous, but the threshold
also shows that more productive, highly skilled labor,
higher u and w, and more impatient consumers,
27 Note that the analytical solution can be computed for the
special case q = 0, such that C = c and n = 0 such that
U = 1. As that would imply no discounting and no license
income, and we are primarily interested in the impact of
stronger patent protection, that special case is less relevant for
the purpose of this paper.
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higher q, unambiguously reduce the growth-maxi-
mizing level of patent protection. The intuition for
these results is that more productive labor in inno-
vation increases the rate of innovation without
patents. Therefore, higher productivity reduces the
effectiveness of patents to increase R&D activity
through shifting incentives from innovation to inven-
tion. Finally, impatience reduces innovation with and
without patents in two ways. Consumers’ willingness
to finance investments in R&D is reduced. This
reduces the benefits of strong patent protection for the
incumbents. Moreover, increasing the rental cost of
capital reduces the profitability of the intermediate
sector. This reduces the incentives to invest in
commercialization. Strong patent protection will
reduce those incentives even more. Consequently
the growth-maximizing level of protection is lower
when consumers are less patient.
4.2 Discussion
We have introduced the parameter n to represent the
strength, length, and breadth of patent protection.
This parameter determines how much of the com-
mercial rents of innovation the original generator of
knowledge can expropriate from the commercializer
of that knowledge. We argue that this parameter
captures the essence of the patent system and the
strength of patent protection. We envision patents as
an instrument of the legislature to redistribute com-
mercial rents from innovation between the creator
and commercializer of knowledge. Stronger patents
imply stronger bargaining power for the knowledge
creator and hence allow him to extract a larger share
of the rents. Longer patenting spells, patentability of
a broader knowledge base in earlier stages of
development, bias in patent infringement courts,
and lower costs of patenting all work to increase
the share of the knowledge creator versus the
potential commercializer. Recent reforms in the US
patent system (see Jaffe and Lerner 2004) are
therefore largely covered by an increase in our
parameter n. We have shown that there may be an
offsetting effect of strengthening patent protection on
the rate of innovation and growth, when invention
and innovation draw on the same scarce resources.
These results strongly contradict the traditional
idea-based growth models of Romer (1990) and
others like him, who do not separate knowledge
creation from commercialization. In the absence of
this separation, one would conclude that internaliza-
tion of spillovers through (re)enforcing intellectual
property rights of R&D laboratories is always a good
idea. Less spillover implies more appropriability and
more R&D, which cause higher growth in the modern
growth literature. This is not merely of academic
interest, as these models lend strong and perhaps
oversimplified support to claims made by patent
lawyers, firms with large R&D laboratories, and
developed countries in World Trade Organization
(WTO) rounds. Our model demonstrates that support
for more and better patent protection needs to at least
be qualified.
As we have argued and shown above, our result
emerges when commercialization and invention are
no longer assumed to collapse into one decision.
When commercialization of new opportunities has to
take place outside the existing and inventing firm,
then barriers to the knowledge spillover may reduce
growth. The risks of being sued for patent infringe-
ment and losing that case in court can overturn the
initial benefits of being able to legally protect
monopoly profits.28 This problem is aggravated when
the patent office allows inventors to patent ideas and
knowledge which they never intended to commer-
cialize themselves. The public policy implications of
this model are therefore straightforward but also
unconventional. To facilitate the spilling over of
knowledge, governments should stop enforcing non-
disclosure agreements in labor contracts, stop enforc-
ing defensive patenting, stop patenting knowledge
unless a working prototype of a commercial product
can be shown, encourage dissemination of knowledge
and labor mobility between entrepreneurship and
wage employment, and try to facilitate generation
and diffusion of corporate R&D output.
Following the traditional endogenous growth the-
orists, we argue there is a case for R&D to be
stimulated, for example through subsidies, but we add
to that usual result the qualification that the subsidy
must be used as leverage to promote commercializa-
tion of results inside and outside the firm. In this way,
government can reduce deadweight losses (subsidiz-
ing R&D investments that incumbent firms would
28 Particularly in industries where the need for formal and
legal protection is not so high.
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have undertaken anyway) and maximize resulting
economic growth and innovation.
5 Conclusions
We have presented an endogenous growth model in
which monopoly rents provide the incentive to
innovate. In our model, rents motivate the commer-
cialization of existing knowledge rather than the
generation of new ideas. The model has entrepreneurs
invest resources in commercialization and capture the
rents from innovation. They do not, however,
produce the opportunities themselves. Incumbent
firms do R&D to maintain competitiveness through
efficiency improvements on their final output, and in
our model the commercial opportunities spill over
from this R&D. We then analyze the impact of
stronger IPR protection and patents in the context of
our model.
The implications of this amended model are more
than trivial. R&D spillovers contribute to growth but,
as spinouts are growth enhancing, nondisclosure
agreements and patenting may turn out to be growth
inhibiting. Patent protection increases incentives to
create and patent knowledge but reduces incentives to
commercialize it. The latter effect may overtake the
former and reduce the aggregate rate of growth.
When IPR protection and patents shift a share of the
rents from knowledge commercializers to knowledge
generators, the resulting rate of innovation in the
economy follows an inverted U-shape in the level of
protection.
New growth theory correctly asserts that the
knowledge generated by commercial R&D can be a
source of steady-state growth, but inaccurately con-
siders it a sufficient precondition or even the most
important one. Protecting and giving incentives for
generation of knowledge are useful and necessary,
but doing so through mechanisms such as patents and
IPR may shift the balance of power in the ex post
bargain over rents too much in favor of knowledge
creators. This can reduce incentives to commercialize
to the extent that economic growth falls. As both the
inventor and the innovator generate large positive
spillovers to society, a more balanced approach to
IPR protection is required.
Knowledge is only valuable to society when it is
commercialized in new products and services. The
patent system was never intended to enable large
firms’ legal departments to bully small competitors
out of adjacent market niches, or to enable individual
inventors who lack the motivation, talent or means to
commercialize their ideas to discourage others from
doing so. As Jaffe and Lerner (2004) have argued
forcefully, however, that is exactly what the most
recent reforms in the US patent system have
accomplished.
In our model we have abstracted from uncertainty
and have introduced IPR protection at a very high
abstraction level as part of the bargain between
knowledge creator and commercializer. That bargain
and the relative bargaining power of the parties
involved may have many other possible legal,
institutional, and economic aspects to be considered.
Possible extensions at this point include the role of
intermediaries such as venture capitalists and univer-
sity technology transfer offices. Also, our crude
parameterization of IPR leaves much to be desired
when it comes to the many dimensions of IPR
protection. O’Donoghue and Zweilmueller (2004),
for example, distinguish leading and lagging breadth,
patentability requirements, and patent length as
relevant and distinct dimensions of patent protection
systems. Stronger protection in one or another of
these dimensions may have a quite different impact
on the relative bargaining power of commercializing
entrepreneurs vis-a`-vis patent owners.29 Optimization
of patent design over these dimensions would require
a more explicit model of the bargaining process to
specify how patents affect relative bargaining
strength and the consequent bargaining outcome that
our parameter reflects. This extension, however, we
leave for future research. In future work, we also aim
to be more explicit on the issue of risk and to derive
more precisely how the ex ante value of new ventures
is shared among parties involved in the innovation
process. Although, to our knowledge, our model
assumptions do not contradict the empirical evidence,
its predictions are yet to be tested against the data.
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition I, the existence,
uniqueness, and stability of the steady-state
equilibrium
We can show the uniqueness of the steady-state
equilibrium by investigating the properties of Eq. 17
in the text:
ð _n=nÞ ¼ wUð Þ
d
cþd uXð Þ ccþd
X Cð _n=nÞNð _n=nÞð Þ dcþdþU Cð _n=nÞNð _n=nÞð Þ ccþd
:
ð17Þ
The left-hand side of this equation is a simple 45
line. A unique steady-state equilibrium can be
established when we show that the right-hand side
intersects that line once and only once in the positive
quadrant. First consider the properties of the func-
tions C() and N() defined in the text. C() falls
monotonically from 1 to c as the growth rate
increases from 0 to infinity. As N() cannot fall
below 0 (as that would imply that license incomes
exceed total intermediate profits) we know that N()
falls from 1 to 0 as the growth rate increases from 0 to
1/n. This implies that C() 9 N() falls from 1 to 0 as
the growth rate increases from 0 to 1/n. The right-






XþU , a positive





0þ1 ¼ 0 for
_n=n ¼ 1=n. As (17) is continuous in C() 9 N() we
have therefore shown that an uneven number and at
least one equilibrium exists. The equilibrium, how-
ever, is not necessarily unique, and stability remains
to be shown.
First consider the restriction for uniqueness. For
multiple steady states it is required that the slope of
the right-hand side of Eq. 17 switches sign at least
twice. Once is insufficient, as the right-hand side
starts from a positive intercept. To intersect the 45
line more than once the right-hand side needs to fall,
then rise, and fall again, or alternatively rise, fall,
rise, and fall again. As C() 9 N() falls monotoni-
cally over the entire domain, this implies that the
right-hand side of (17) needs to switch sign in
C() * N(). Defining W : C() * N() and taking the
derivative of the denominator in the right-hand side








which can be shown to switch sign at most once over




Thereby we show that there is one unique steady-
state equilibrium in the model. By the fact that the
right-hand side of (17) intersects the 45 line only
once in the positive quadrant, we also know that it
must intersect it from above. Also, as the right-hand
side of (17) represents the implied growth rate of n
when the highly skilled labor market is in equilib-
rium, an actual out-of-steady-state growth rate to the
left of the intersection point implies a rate of variety
expansion that exceeds the steady-state growth rate.
This implies that A/n will fall and the knowledge
spillovers to entrepreneurs and R&D workers adjust
to re-establish the equality of variety expansion and
productivity growth rates. This mechanism implies
that the unique steady-state growth rate is also stable.
Q.E.D.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition II
and Corollary I, the comparative statics
of increasing patent protection
To investigate the effect of an increase in n we need
to consider its effect on the right-hand side of (17).
As Appendix 1 has shown, this is a continuous curve
over the domain 0–1/n that intersects the 45 line








to a positive horizontal intercept at
{1/n,0}, switching slope sign at most once (from
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positive to negative) in the positive quadrant. There
are now three general possibilities, illustrated in
Fig. 2. It is immediately clear that the horizontal
intercept will shift inwards for higher levels of patent
protection. Ceteris paribus this causes the steady-state
growth rate to fall unambiguously in cases I and II
and will first increase and then decrease the growth
rate in case III. However, there is also an impact on
the vertical intercept and the position of the curve
when n increases.
First consider the impact on the point where RHS





where W is negatively dependent on the growth rate
of n through C() and N() and negatively on n
through N(). U is positively affected by an increase
in n. This implies that the growth rate at which the
right-hand side switches sign must fall for an increase
in n. This implies that the equilibrium growth rate can
only rise for an increase in n when there is an increase
in the maximum of RHS. By plugging (19) into the
right-hand side of (17), however, we obtain after
some rearranging
RHS ¼ w dcþdu ccþd d
c
: ð20Þ
It is obvious that this maximum value is not
dependent on n. From this we can also conclude that
the vertical intercept increases in n in cases I and III
and drops in case II. This concludes the graphical
analysis and allows us to state Proposition II. Only in
case III will an increase in n cause an increase in the
steady-state growth rate. Case III is characterized by
the restriction that the maximum of RHS in (20) is
less than the corresponding value of LHS, which is
equal to the growth rate that satisfies the condition in
(19). Recalling the definitions of C() and N() and U
and X, we can rewrite (19) into:
qþ c _n=n
qþ _n=n ð1 n _n=nÞ ¼
cðaþ ðaþ bÞð1 a bÞnqÞ
dðaþ bÞð1 a bÞ :
As the first fraction on the left-hand side must take
a value between 1 and c, the growth rate that satisfies
















By taking the minimum value that S can attain we
can be sure that we are in situation III when that
minimum value exceeds the maximum value of RHS.
We are definitely in situation III, where more patent











which is what we state in Proposition II. The proof of
Corollary I follows from reversing the argument
above and deriving the condition for which we are
certain that the effect of increased patent protection
on the steady-state rate of innovation is negative.
As the right-hand side of the condition is a positive
constant, lower initial levels of patent protection
make it more likely that the economy will benefit
from increasing patent protection. It can also be
verified that a lower output elasticity of knowledge in
final goods production, a, increases that probability
(as it reduces the private incentives to do R&D in the
RHS 
LHS 




LHS IIII II 
Fig. 2 The steady state
growth rate
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absence of license income). Also, less productive
skilled labor, u and w, strengthens the case for more
protection. The intuition is that this higher produc-
tivity increases the growth rate at any level of patent
protection, and therefore less protection is required to
generate the positive spillovers. The effects of d and c
are ambiguous. More patient consumers (lower q)
also improves the case for patent protection.
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